(Most of this argument is based on the assumption that one understands Epicurean philosophy)
Nagel asks a simple question in relation of death being an evil: it is the question whether the non-realization of this possibility is in every case a misfortune, or whether it depends on what can naturally be hoped for. He states that the ideas can be illustrated by an example of deprivation that approaches death, such as an intelligent person that incurs a severe brain injury resulting him to a mental condition such as that of an infant. Most people would consider this a misfortune for himself, as well as others and society. But this does not mean that the individual is unfortunate. We as an outside observer feel bad for him and his situation, but the person themselves does not mind their condition. It is the same condition that he was in at the age of infancy which he did not mind then, except that the body size is different. If we do not pity an infant then, why pity a person at an infancy state of mind.
If we use Nagel’s argument in relation to the fear of death, then you would find that any fear of death is irrational. Upon death we lose our conciseness, making us unaware or not able to realize what is going on. Since our soul, according to Epicurus, dissipates throughout the cosmos and we do not have to worry about an afterlife, death does not affect us once you are dead. Once dead we can not realize that we are dead, and if things such as death being an evil are about the realization of them, we do not have to worry about death being an evil since once dead, realization becomes impossible. Therefore death is nothing to us, since one can not realize that they are dead.
